I. Theoretical Framework: A Concept of Political Judicial Making
Until the beginning of the 20 th century, once the realist approach to law and society was emerging as part of academia, a prevailing concept among scholars of law held that justices solely rule on concrete disputes concerning specific controversial issues (lis). The rules of judicial engagement were largely perceived as based on autonomous set of external criteria that are transcendent to immediate sociopolitical interests. Honestly, that erroneous concept was prevalent in political studies as well.
Liberal democratic theory for its part has perceived justices, in theory and in empirical research, as institutionally separate from governmental officials and legislatures. In different cultures around the globe, and in various languages, officials and legislatures have been perceived as policy makers, while justices have been perceived as messengers of normative justice as opposed to political praxis.
Some prominent trends in liberal political theory and in theories of law, politics, and society have generated that erroneous conception which has dichotomized between policy making and judicial decisions. Apparently, whilst policy makers were supposed to navigate the polity, justices were aimed to resolve legalistic formalistic disputes. With the emergence of legal realism in the 20 th century, with its effects on political science since the 1950s' and later with the evolvement of critical political legal studies, such a dichotomy between law and policy-making has gradually been demystified. Empirical studies concerning issues ranging from education, housing, racial relations, gender issues, health, abortion, transportation, religion, and national security, have demonstrated that justices formed and promoted public policy, above and through their functions in resolving distinct and concrete legal disputes (Fisher, 2 Horwitz, and Reed: 1993; Krislov, 1965 (Fitzpatrick: 1992; Glendon: 1991) .
That public image of courts in democracies as being politically neutral is a doubleedged political sword. On the one hand, it provides courts with the institutional ability to engage in political controversial affairs, based on litigation and cases submitted to courts by various public agents, like Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The more a political setting is publicly viewed as segmented, polarized, fragmented and corrupted, the more appeals are submitted to courts that are perceived as detached from low politics and as reliable institutions of democratic supervision.
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On the other hand, it makes courts rather confined in their predilection to actually challenge the state, its power foci, narratives, and legal ideology, since such a systematic judicial challenge may be publicly seen as biased and political.
Courts are facing three meaningful constraints as institutions of policy making. First, national narratives are constraints. State's courts can not and would not incline to struggle with national narratives, i.e., with the most fundamental ideologies of the state. Accordingly, one would not expect the US Federal Supreme Court to directly challenge the value of the American Federation or to significantly criticize the essence of the capitalist system. The second constraint is public opinion, and the fact that only rarely courts rule against a specific and prevailing public mood as articulated by influential public organizations and communities (Barzilai and Sened: 1997; Mishler and Sheehan. 1993) . In other words, courts are majoritarian institutions, and they incline to rule in compatibility with the usually perceived general public trend as reflected in political struggles and political pressures.
It does not mean that justices ignore the formal legal text. However, where the formal legal text is broad and vague enough (as legal texts usually are), a majoritarian interpretation by the justices is more plausible than an alternative challenging hermeneutics (Cover: 1992, Mishler and Sheehan: 1993) . Courts would like to be supported by the general public, especially by those public segments that empower them as political institutions-the middle and the upper social classes and the professional legal community of law professors, lawyers, and legalistic reporters. In this context, the attitudes of the professional community may have a special effect on justices. The third constraint is structural. Supreme Courts may be reluctant to alter the status quo whilst a certain significant political coalition, e.g., within the parliament and the executive, may overturn the court's ruling through counter-judicial legislation or administrative sanctions (Epstein and Knight: 1998) . In other words, the strength of a political coalition outside the courtroom may well affect the tendency of justices to rule in a way that change a prevailing public policy (Barzilai and Sened: 1997) .
Until now, I have posed the strategic political environment in which justices are operating as policy makers through judicial engagement in public issues. There are four variables that should be counted and expounded in any theoretical and empirical analysis: the relevant legal text, national narratives, majoritarian/counter-majoritarian mood in its relation to appeals submitted to court, and the political coalition/opposition outside the courtroom that may react to the judicial ruling. In a different paper/article myself and Itai Sened have explained that once the legal text and the national narratives are taken as fixed parameters, fascinating institutional games are developed between the courts and the executive (Barzilai and Sened 1997) .
A fifth variable may be the judicial coalition within the courtroom, but this variable deserves a separate article by itself. Now, in that theoretical configuration that relates importance to political context as a strategic constraint on justices and judges, let us turn to exploration of the essence of powerful national security arguments. I shall argue that we can theorize why in that context, national security arguments hamper judicial review. Exemplification of my arguments through analysis of counterterrorist law will follow.
II. A Concept of National Security Arguments in Courts
Wars and other national security crises endanger the potential and existing democratic attributes of the 'rule of law.' They often demand extensive mobilization of human and economic resources, in ways that often contradict civil rights, e.g., rights for privacy and property. Hence, the nationalization of economic resources, the The damage inflicted on human rights in times of security crises is possible due to epistemological predicaments, cultural narratives, and institutional deeds. Human beings presume that unity is a crucial element of military victory. Accordingly, a collective discourse that embraces institutional efficiency, almost at all costs, is generated. It can delegitimize, inter alia, judicial adjudication and public accountability (Barzilai 1996) . A democracy should strive to deconstruct the imposition of limitations on the individual autonomy and on the community sui generis identities, but one of the principles of war management, however, is public conformity. Authoritative laws, administrative sanctions, and emergency legislation (e.g., censorship, expropriations, and detentions) have been common in democracies Political elite mold the 'rule of law' by referring to national security terms. The desire to form internal political order, by eliminating political foes and reducing the probability of an effective opposition, lead political elite to manipulate their legal systems in order to legitimize non-democratic measures in the name of preserving democracy. The political elite facilitates the mythical power of law (in its broad sense) as if it is transcendent criterion for order, an objective, absolute, and a just yardstick for managing public life. Law is neither autonomous to the political ideology of the state, nor is it independent of its institutional conjunction and apparatus of control. Its perceived association with national security allows the political elite to utilize it further for external and internal political purposes.
Law Such mythical interdependence empowers and is empowered by the political praxis, in which law is influenced by national security and manipulated for political purposes.
III. Fighting Terrorism as a Challenge to Judicial Making: Or-Who is a
Terrorist?
The Legal Text and National Narratives
The legal text is one variable to be considered once the force of national security arguments in courts is analyzed. There are two levels of definition of a terrorist.-a.
Basic level-a man/woman who kills innocent human beings for political purposes. B.
A compound level that suggests various problematizations to that basic definition.
Many of these problematizations are outside the scope of legal arguments in courts.
For example-what about states that kill; under which conditions states are terrorists?
I claim that the legal field cannot be the first order criterion for such definitions since the legal field already reflects various political categorizations. Accordingly, the etiology of Ani-Terrorist Acts should be looked at in various sociopolitical configurations. Doing that explores the political forces that are embodied in and generated through anti-terrorist laws. Two main political forces underline antiterrorist laws: uncertainty and the desire of political elite to control.
The obvious background to anti-terrorist laws is domestic and international conflicts.
Thus, recent anti-terrorist legislation was prepared in the US and some European countries prior to the September 2001 events and activated afterwards. I would like to offer a distinction between ideological 'terrorism' and ethno-religious or national 'terrorism.' In fighting terrorism, the first is less problematical as long as infringement on human rights is concerned since it is more focused on targeted people/groups, and the second is more problematical since it may encompass large-scale populations.
Furthermore, as the experiences of Germany, Italy, and Japan compared with Israel, US, Indonesia, Philippines, Russia, Spain, and England/North Ireland, demonstrate, anti-terrorist laws are more efficient in the first case of ideological terrorism than in the case of the latter, national or ethnic-religious terrorism.
Since the definition of terrorism raises a variety of epistemological and empirical difficulties, state law may be used for the generation and construction of hegemonic cultures in the political center on the expense of marginalized communities and political groups. Hence, it might be, and that danger should be avoided, that a politics of 'who is a terrorist' will become through law, a politics of 'who is a patriot. Germany to marginalize minority and opposition groups through using anti-terrorist legislation in order to propel means as surveillance and ethnic profiling. Courts have not inclined to hamper these trends. The mere definition of 'terrorist' is made in most democracies by the executive branch, without sufficient judicial and parliamentary supervision, if at all. Once a group is on the terrorist list, it is subjected to harsh legalistic means without sufficient democratic guarantees. Furthermore, during perceived national security challenges, the political discretion to form lists of suspected terrorists, is gradually transformed to the bureaucratic level of security services and armed forces.
Coercive Majoritarianism and the Lack of Opposition: The Lasswellian ModelThe Garrison State Hypothesis
In the beginning of the 1940s Harold Lasswell, one of the most important legal sociologist ever, has published his classic and seminal work on processes of militarization during protracted security conflicts. According to Lasswell, conditions of uncertainty in times of warfare generate more reliance of civilian elites including judges, on the security establishment, and in turn such a process incites militarization of democratic societies.
Based on that model, the Garrison State Model, I argue that conditions of fighting terrorism significantly infringe upon the ability of courts to supervise over security and military authorities. Furthermore, how a democracy should balance between these values and the secrecy required for efficient fighting against terrorism? How the public would know against whom the means of anti-terrorist laws is actually targeted?
I argue that this important set of questions is crucial for democracies in the aftermath of the September 11, events.
The Israeli case-that gradually begins to be more relevant for Western democracies---demonstrates the complexities of judicial supervision on the security authorities. 
From Judicial Review to Political Prosecution
While parliamentary review is often too fragile and limited due to fragmentation, polarization, and politicization, judicial review might be seen as a better means of supervision. But courts are often majoritarian, and in cases in which national security arguments are raised, the establishment of the security authorities and the executive, 
Conclusion
One who dwells on the experience of democracies, especially taking into account the reactions to the September 11 2001 events, may suggest that the dilemma that we are unfortunately forced to face is not how much national security a democracy can take, but how much democracy a national security can take. 
